

Increasing food aid

Prospects for the 1990s

Raymond F. Hopkins

When carefully targeted, food aid stabilizes domestic supplies in food-insecure countries and alleviates hunger. Conflicting objectives have marked food aid since the 1950s: humanitarian relief, surplus disposal and expansion of export markets, support of foreign policy, and overseas economic development. In recent years, world-wide food aid has fluctuated between 10 and 13 million tons, over half provided by the US. At least a doubling or more of food aid in the 1990s is justified and even current allocations can be made more effective if addressed to the needs of the hungry. Prospects for enhanced food aid, however, appear dim unless broad public support can be mobilized or current objectives change in the context of realigning economic relations among states.

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Food aid, representing about 10% of total foreign aid transfers to developing countries, has become a major mechanism for stabilizing domestic supplies in food-insecure countries and for targeting food to alleviate hunger.¹ Most projections made in the late 1980s forecast growing shortfalls in domestic food supplies in many least developed countries (LDCs). Thus these states, chronic food-insecure countries, seem unlikely without foreign assistance to be able to meet the needs of their hungry populations in the 1990s as their food consumption requirements outstrip production. As their import needs grow in the 1990s, so will their need for food aid or cash aid to purchase food.

A recent US National Research Council workshop reviewed estimates from various research centres. These estimates, relying on computer models to project the world's food supply and demand, forecast a growth of imports by LDCs from 83 million tons in 1989/90 to 163 million tons or higher in the year 2000. The 163-million-ton figure is the minimum projection forecast, developed from a World Bank 'modest growth' projection.² Commercial imports, these models assume, will meet much of future growth in food-import needs of the LDCs. At the same time, however, especially in Africa, many countries have experienced declining per capita production in the last two decades. In such countries and in those where economic growth has been stagnant, projected future import needs, just to prevent famine or increased hunger, outstrip growth in effective commercial imports. Figure 1 depicts the historical trend that points to a growing disparity between sub-Saharan Africa and the rest of the world in per capita food production. Some Asian and Central American countries betray situations similar to that of Africa. The trends that Figure 1 depicts explain why forecasters particularly anticipate larger food import and food aid needs for the African region.


This article looks, therefore, at the question of how much food low-income, food-vulnerable countries are likely to need during the 1990s and assesses the prospects for meeting this 'need'. Given growing constraint on budgets in the US and Europe and the decline of world food stocks from 26% to 17% of world consumption since 1986, tighter markets, higher prices and a heavily constrained supply of food aid may become common in the 1990s. Limits on food aid availability could

¹World Bank, *Hunger and Poverty*, World Bank, Washington, DC, USA, 1986, p 89; and *The Challenge of Hunger in Africa: A Call to Action*, World Bank, Washington, DC, USA, 1988.

²*Food Aid Projections for the Decade of the 1990s: Report of an Ad Hoc Panel Meeting October 6 & 7, 1988*, Board on Science and Technology for International Development, Office of International Affairs, National Research Council, Washington, DC, USA, p 136.

Figure 1. Trends of per capita food production (1961–65 = 100).

Sources: Index estimates are based upon integrating data from: USDA, Economic Research Service, *Indices of Per Capita Food Production*, USDA, Washington, DC, USA, September 1989; World Bank, *Toward Sustained Development in Sub-Saharan Africa*, World Bank, Washington, DC, USA, 1984, p 15; FAO, *The State of Food and Agriculture*, FAO, Rome, Italy, 1973, p 183.



occur in spite of growing need; a similar situation occurred in 1972–74. Nonetheless, even if total food aid does not keep pace with need, reform of the food aid regime’s rules and reallocation of its resources could make whatever amount of this resource is available of relatively greater value for hungry people than it has been previously.

Background

In the early 1950s three political forces combined to inaugurate food aid as an international assistance regime. First, surplus agricultural commodities owned by the US government piled up as a result of domestic price-support programmes and created pressure for their disposal to poor countries. Second, anticommunist attitudes in the US promoted promises of foreign assistance to help weak countries stave off economic problems that encouraged leftist movements. Finally, threats of famine, especially in India and Pakistan, and a recognition of widespread hunger in poor countries stimulated US humanitarian impulses, especially as articulated by churches and voluntary agencies, to seek stable resources for overseas programmes. These pressures resulted in proposals for formal food aid legislation. The US Congress passed Public Law 480 in 1954. This legislation provided for institutionalizing previous short-term or *ad hoc* measures; the Eisenhower administration put it into effect. Within two years US food aid was providing over 10 million tons of grain to American post-war allies such as Japan, the UK, FR Germany and Taiwan as well as nutritionally poor states in Asia and Latin America. Meanwhile, Canada also began a modest programme on a regular basis, but it was limited to a few countries and was about 5% of the size of the US programme.

Since its inauguration, US food aid legislation has continuously specified four objectives: humanitarian relief of undernourishment, expansion of export markets, support of foreign policy objectives, and overseas economic development. A fifth purpose, the disposal of surplus US farm products – which otherwise cost tax money to store and which depressed producers’ prices – was an important motivation in creating the legislation and retains an important role in its operation. Today most donors pursue such multiple objectives in different degrees. Europe and Canada, for example, give high priority to overseas development objectives, whereas Japan and Scandinavia especially emphasize relief.³

³Shahla Shapouri and Margaret Missiaen, *Food Aid: Motivation and Allocation Criteria*, Foreign Agricultural Economic Report No 240, USDA Economic Research Service, Washington, DC, USA, February 1990, pp 18–22.

Regardless of emphasis, such multiple objectives often conflict in determining allocations. Countries that are good candidates for becoming commercial customers often receive priority for food aid allocations, especially from France and the USA. Such commercial calculations seldom target the most needy countries. In other instances countries with modest needs, such as Egypt or Jamaica, are given high priority for political purposes, even by the World Food Programme (WFP). United Nations (UN) agencies are characteristically under some pressure to allocate some resources to satisfy the UN's universality principles of expressing friendship with such states. Politically chosen recipients are not necessarily capable, compared to other possible recipients, of using food aid effectively for longer-term development activities. As a result, were allocation priorities to put long-term food security of recipients as the central objective of food aid, its impact in the fight to end hunger could be enhanced.⁴

International food aid pledges

In the 1989 Tanco Lecture, Maurice Strong called for a world food bank to attack problems of global food insecurity, especially dangerous for poor, weak states. This idea, first broached by the first Secretary General of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), Boyd-Orr, in 1946,⁵ has only a weak existence today in the form of the Food Aid Convention (FAC).⁶ This convention, an international agreement first signed at the end of the Kennedy Round of trade talks in 1967, seeks to limit pro-cyclical fluctuations in food aid and to distribute the burden among both exporting and importing wealthier states. It includes most donor countries as signatories. It was recently reaffirmed in 1986. The US minimum international pledge, 4.47 million tons of grain, represents over half the total tonnage of 7.6 million tons of food aid committed by all donors' pledges. Most donors provide the minimum tonnage they pledge and little more, except for cash contributions to the World Food Programme or other UN agencies that provide emergency famine relief. The US, however, has regularly supplied tonnages exceeding its minimum commitment by 1–4 million tons (see Table 1).

Two problems exist with the large role of the US. First, the largest share of US food arrives as sales under the Title I programme of PL 480. Unlike other donors the US has always had two major forms of food aid – concessional sales to be repaid as Title I, and food provided as a grant, often through voluntary and international bodies, known as Title II.

⁴John Cathie, *The Political Economy of Food Aid*, St Martin's Press, New York, NY, USA, 1982.

⁵*Ibid*, pp 32–33.

⁶For a review, see John Parotte, 'The Food Aid Convention: its history and scope', *IDS Bulletin*, Vol 14, No 2, 1983, pp 10–15.

Table 1. Cereal food aid by principal donors (in '000 tons).

	1967/68	1972/73	1978/79	1981/82	1982/83	1984/85	1985/86	1986/87	1987/88	1988/89	1989/90
Argentina		2	30	20	33	51	44	24	25	35	30
Australia	186	259	329	485	349	466	345	368	328	330	300
Canada	798	808	735	600	843	943	1 216	1 240	1 062	1 000	900
EEC		986	1 159	1 602	1 596	2 505	1 614	1 863	2 450	2 000	2 000
Japan		528	352	507	517	295	450	529	547	380	350
Sweden	19	67	104	119	87	88	69	74	115	80	40
USA	13 504	6 948	6 238	5 341	5 375	7 536	6 675	7 861	7 946	5 500	5 400
USSR	1 714	2 200	300								
Total (inc others)	16 221	9 964	9 500	9 140	9 238	12 510	10 949	12 579	13 382	9 757	9 400

Note: 1989 and 1990 are estimates.

Sources: *Foreign Agricultural Trade of the United States*, USDA, Washington, DC, USA, June 1979, p 73; *World Food Needs and Availabilities, 1989/90: Summer Update*, USDA, Washington, DC, USA, August 1989, p 18.

Food sales under Title I programmes use 'soft loans' (usually 2–3% interest); these normally require hard-currency repayment and the amount supplied under Title I is subject to substantial variation. Nevertheless, since 1980, when higher pledges were set, the US international obligation has never had to be tested against Congress's budget authorization. If in the 1990s prices rise, however, and the amount the US budgets for food aid (which in real dollars has declined substantially over the last two decades) remains fixed, the US could fail to meet its international commitments. One way to avoid this would be to take into account a food-security priority for food aid as part of the legislation, especially for the grant portion of PL 480 aimed especially at humanitarian and relief goals, either under Title II, or by allowing Title I allocations to be full grants, or both. The new 1990 farm bill in the US, as proposed in the Senate's Leahy-Lugar bill's PL 480 reauthorization introduced in April 1990, moves precisely in this direction. It also brings the US food aid mandate more in line with that of other donor states.⁷

In addition a legislatively mandated tonnage minimum in the PL 480 bill for meeting the US FAC commitment with grant food aid would not be without precedent. One such minimum tonnage requirement already exists. After having their supplies dramatically cut in the 1973–74 period, voluntary agencies successfully lobbied to have a minimum tonnage requirement added to the free donation component of the programme, primarily used to feed hungry people directly through humanitarian outreach. The minimum tonnage requirement assures private agencies and the World Food Programme (WFP), which develop staff and invest resources in longer-term feeding programmes or emergency interventions, that their programmes will not suffer a sudden cut-off in the necessary supply of food. The tonnage requirement is also helpful as a guarantee to recipient countries of the reliability of food aid.

Shrinking resource

Debate over the future of food aid must confront the reality of a shrinking resource. In particular, as a provider of food aid the US contribution has declined. In the 1950s, when the US inaugurated its food aid programme, it supplied 95% of the world's food aid. In recent years, however, the US provided half the tonnage it did two decades ago and the portion amounted to less than 65% in tonnage (see Figure 2 and

⁷This legislation, introduced on 4 April 1990, calls for a portion of Title I to be donated freely.




Figure 2. US cereals food aid as a percentage of worldwide food aid (millions of tons), 1971–90.

Note: 1989 and 1990 are estimates.
Source: FAO.

Table 1) and about 50% in value of all food aid supplied. Other countries such as Canada, Japan and some European nations now play a larger role. The criticism of food aid sceptics that US food aid is driven by surpluses, especially voiced in the 1950s, can be shown to be largely a matter of the past. A recent US Department of Agriculture (USDA) study demonstrates that surplus disposal motives *per se* explain relatively little of the variation in allocation in current US food aid.⁸ It is even less useful to account for flows from Europe or Canada, for which emergency responses account for the greatest amount of year-to-year variations.

Budgetary pressures also play a role. Further, the effect of national commodity interests as a motivation yields good predictions of actual allocations in 1975–85, especially of US food aid.⁹ The USDA study, using regression analysis to test for the effect of politics, need and surplus stocks on food aid, forecasts that ‘if current distribution patterns continue, recipients’ needs will be given more weight in allocation decisions, especially with the growth in the share of multilateral food aid and in the number of food importers (such as Japan) participating in the programs’.¹⁰ Their conclusion, however – one widely shared – is that if weather and domestic set-asides (such as the environmental crop acreage reduction programme in the US) lead to reduced world food surpluses, under existing political arrangements food aid will not only shrink but its allocation will come under greater pressure from political and market development objectives.¹¹

The US, nevertheless, remains the largest exporter of grains and the most experienced nation in attacking hunger overseas. Its lack of leadership in the 1980s may be attributable, at least in part, to accumulated legislative restrictions and requirements, as well as to shifts in world economic power and the recent presidential priorities.¹² International political economy issues of trade and debt loom large in shaping the future of food aid. Such concerns will be consequential in the preparation of the 1990 reauthorization of the US PL 480 food aid programme, and in the role food aid plays in the world’s economy in the 1990s.

Food aid needs

Historically, projections of food aid needs have played an important role in support of coordinated policies to alleviate hunger, which has been a major concern since the World Food Conference of 1974. In the late 1980s the FAO, the USDA’s Economic Research Service and the International Food Policy Research Institute have all undertaken systematic analyses of food shortfalls in low-income, food-deficit countries. These studies generally assume a ‘gap’ analysis of some kind, postulated on the inability of a poor country to provide for its food needs from its production plus imports. To fill this gap food aid is seen to be needed. Whereas some analyses seek to apply a desired standard for needed nutrition, the most frequently used procedure for estimating need as a gap is based on differences between domestic production trends and import capabilities; a gap grows when import capacity (based on available foreign exchange) plus local food production falls short of an amount necessary to maintain existing levels of caloric intake. Such a ‘gap’ represents only what is needed to cover current, often nutritionally inadequate, levels of household consumption.

⁸Shapouri and Missiaen, *op cit*, Ref 3.

⁹The Shapouri and Missiaen study found that variation in total US aid could be accounted for by the domestic stock situation and overseas need with an R^2 of 0.93. Similar regression analyses for Canada and the EEC resulted in an R^2 of 0.60 and 0.57, respectively: *ibid*, p 27.

¹⁰*Ibid*, p 37.

¹¹Stanley R. Johnson, ed, *World Food Trade, Food Security and Aid in the 1990s*, Westview Press, Boulder, CO, USA, forthcoming.

¹²See Robert Gilpin, *The Political Economy of International Relations*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, USA, 1987; and Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of Great Powers*, Random House, New York, NY, USA, 1987.

Table 2. Estimates of annual food aid needs for 1990–2000.

Institutional source	Low	Average	High
IFPRI ^a	29–39	37–56	55–74
IASA/BLS		30	
USDA	21	29	56
Nutritional Need ^b	30	42	55
Iowa State U/FAPRI		34	
FAO	19	30	38

Notes: All estimates were made in million metric tons of cereal equivalent. All except IFPRI estimates were deductions from trade flows assuming some constant fraction of food aid.

^aVariations based on including different countries.

^bPinstrup-Andersen calculation based on IFPRI figures.

Source: National Research Council, *op cit*, Ref 2, p 7.

The 1989 US National Research Council workshop concluded that a doubling or more of food aid in the 1990s was justified. Table 2 provides the figures supplied by different organizations at the workshop. The estimates of Iowa State University Food and Agricultural Policy Research Institute (FAPRI) and others were lower than those of the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), but all forecast a growing need.

Against these forecasts lie two constraints. First, recipient countries enjoy a limited capacity to use food aid effectively in addressing emerging needs as well as longer-term development goals. Ethiopia in 1990 with its internal war and the Philippines with its government mismanagement are cases in point. Second, budgetary pressure, especially in the US, coupled with a lower degree of interest in food as aid from non-exporting states such as Japan, makes political support for expanded food aid programmes by donors highly unlikely. Short of events that reconfigure priorities, as the food panic of 1973–74 did, it is difficult to envisage donors supplying the doubling or tripling of food aid that trade and development specialists predict will be needed in the 1990s as projected in figures in Table 2.

Thus by 1990 the exercise of projecting needs may have become politically irrelevant. Donors do not allocate on the basis of need. Long-term plans and commitments of food aid revolve around international pledges to the World Food Programme, minimum burden-sharing obligations under the Food Aid Convention and special bilateral political commitments, such as the US has made with Egypt.

Ironically, just as the USDA is terminating its needs-estimation exercise (after 10 years the last *World Food Needs and Availabilities* was published in Winter 1990) and IFPRI has been cautious in publishing its projected 'need' results, evidence mounts that high population growth rates in Africa, coupled with continuing economic problems, make food aid increasingly a needed resource. Furthermore, in Asia, with its much greater population and modest current caloric levels, shocks by weather or civil turmoil to food systems could lead to dramatic increases in need.

Reallocating food aid to the hungry

In addition to generating a greater supply of food aid for the 1990s, it is necessary to change allocation criteria so that food aid better addresses the problem of hunger. Although emergencies take 20–30% of global food aid, especially with countries such as Sudan, Ethiopia and Mozambique requiring large emergency aid, these special famine-relief operations do not operate well to reduce long-term hunger. The bulk of aid should be allocated in commodities that are better suited for sale at a high value. The revenue from such sales can then buy greater amounts of local grain for targeted food programmes or support development projects not using food *per se*. Consequently, donors would have to make food security the overriding objective for food aid and the creation of long-term assets and the management of national food systems central to the criteria for allocation.

If allocations were reformed in this way, food aid – both bilateral and multilateral – would be more universally targeted at relieving chronic overseas hunger. Allocations to Africa would go up in light of the trends shown in Figure 1. Table 3 shows the current allocations from all sources of food aid to needy recipients – ie low-income, food-deficit countries. If

Table 3. Total cereal imports and food aid (FA) in '000 tons to selected food-insecure countries, 1987-89.

	1987/88 Total imports	FA	%FA	1988/89 Total imports	FA	%FA	Alt FA alloc for need, 1989 ^a
<i>Sub-Saharan Africa</i>	8 182	3 806	47	7 513	3 011	40	3 844
Angola	307	108	35	319	116	36	107
Ethiopia	1 214	1 114	92	452	452	100	950
Ghana	234	100	43	211	88	42	127
Kenya	199	143	72	295	123	42	398
Mozambique	506	506	100	506	506	100	551
Senegal	502	133	26	626	67	11	57
Somalia	228	168	74	246	176	72	135
Sudan	553	525	95	609	410	67	187
Zaire	350	129	37	378	127	34	127
Zambia	102	102	100	139	112	81	78
<i>Middle East</i>	11 316	1 997	18	10 198	1 488	15	775
Egypt	8 937	1 750	20	8 730	1 192	14	536
Morocco	2 379	247	10	1 467	295	20	0
<i>Asia</i>	24 869	3 868	16	28 595	3 176	11	4 464
Bangladesh	2 911	1 778	61	2 138	1 356	63	1 598
China	15 510	380	2	15 973	235	1	N/A
India	666	219	33	2 627	322	12	1 692
Indonesia	1 778	226	13	1 570	182	12	0
Philippines	1 293	477	37	1 337	307	23	144
Sri Lanka	851	261	31	1 186	278	23	264
Vietnam	318	49	15	425	114	27	N/A
<i>Central and South America</i>	1 879	1 439	77	1 842	1 391	76	837
Bolivia	324	224	69	253	147	58	175
Dominican Republic	599	336	56	632	349	55	85
El Salvador	214	214	100	214	214	100	70
Honduras	204	143	70	201	154	77	98
Nicaragua	175	175	100	151	151	100	11
<i>Other</i>							
Oceania	252	0	0	249	0	0	
Total, low-income, food-insecure states	46 498	11 109	24	48 396	9 066	19	10 044
Total world figures for developing countries	116 000	13 503	12	117 000	10 044	9	10 044

Note: ^aThese are calculated using figures from the USDA's *World Food Needs and Availabilities*, Winter 1989, p 4. The figures assume an identical total amount of aid (10 044) but reallocate according to the nutrition-based estimates done of 'assessed additional cereal needs' by USDA's Economic Research Service.

Source: UN Food and Agriculture Organization, Commodities and Trade Division. See *Food Outlook*, February 1990, pp 2, 39-40. Food-insecure countries encompassed here are designated by the FAO terminology as 'low-income food-deficit countries'.

food security based on poverty were the central allocative criterion, then clearly more food aid would go to particularly vulnerable poor countries, such as those in sub-Saharan Africa, and less to Egypt with its 3000-calories-per-capita diet, as the last column of Table 3, which 'reallocates' the 1988/89 food aid total of 10 million tons using a nutritional need criterion, indicates. In fact, based on these hunger-oriented allocation estimates, 32.7 million tons, over three times the current level of availability, are needed. Thus Asia and sub-Saharan Africa, even without adding to food aid availabilities, should receive more of current allocations; however, their food aid would climb dramatically if donors supplied amounts sufficient to address under-nutrition. International conferences and legislative bodies in donor states, such as the European Parliament and the US Senate, have espoused food security and hunger as key allocation considerations. Since the 1960s the security criterion has grown in importance, but it has yet to receive a dominant position.¹³

One step towards international reform in the food security direction would be linked to the discussions on reduction of agricultural trade

¹³Raymond F. Hopkins, 'The evolution of food aid', *Food Policy*, Vol 9, No 4, November 1984, pp 345-362.

distorting practices. In negotiations only food aid that is 'bona fide' is exempted from trade rules. As specified in the ongoing negotiations of the Uruguay Round (the Eighth) of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) talks, only 'bona fide' food aid would be sanctioned. Grant aid, targeted without commercial trade concerns as the major rationale, would reallocate food aid towards the hungry. Under this option to serve food-security goals, monetization of food, commodity swap arrangements, or both, would be especially important to enhance effective security impacts and to ensure maximum benefits. Allocations when food is to be sold would need to be flexible, allowing for year-to-year variations in particular countries as their domestic production changes. Some flexibility to substitute cash resources for long-term projects, especially in association with general development assistance budgets or through flexible monetization rules, could be encouraged in the design of food aid contracts. The reform option further raises the question of how food could more usefully be integrated with the international trade and diplomatic goal of creating efficient international markets under GATT. One possibility is to eliminate completely the use of concessional loans. Among donor states only the US Title I programme does this with any frequency. It is no surprise, perhaps, that a January 1990 study by the US Congressional Budget Office (CBO) considers eliminating Title I sales as a cost-reducing measure.¹⁴

Management of food aid can also be more effective. For the US, future aid could be separated to a greater degree from the Department of Agriculture much as DG VIII (the Development Directorate) in the European Economic Community (EEC) has largely taken over using European countries' food aid in the 1980s from DG VI (the Agriculture Directorate). The development agencies in Australia and Canada – food-exporting countries like the US – similarly control food aid rather than giving their ministries of agriculture or trade the lead role as the US has done.

Food and hunger in the 1990s

As other contributors to this special issue have noted, the 20th century has witnessed commendable progress in reducing hunger, reaching a plateau in the 1990s. Only half the proportion of the population affected in the 1950s is now estimated as undernourished or worse. Food aid could be a crucial intervention in achieving a continuation of this laudable trend, yet the prospects for enhanced food aid to meet the demands forecasted for the 1990s appear dim. Political motivation among donors has weakened. Farm lobbies are both weaker and less interested in food aid. The reform measures advocated by the WFP, private scholars and some legislative proposals for using food aid with priority for food security goals have, unfortunately, further reduced its relevance to diplomatic negotiators of developed donor states. The recent trends and levels of giving by donors indicate that in the 1980s, except for the high surplus years in 1985–87, which coincided with famine needs in Africa, food aid stayed remarkably stable at near 10 million tons (see Table 1). Since this is half to one-third the estimated needs outlined in Table 2, and since the salience of food shortages, as evidenced by coverage in the popular press, has fallen since the peak years of 1974 and 1985, the prospects of political support among donors to meet the need estimates discussed earlier are modest to none.

¹⁴Congressional Budget Office, *Reducing the Deficit: Spending and Revenue Options. A Report to the Senate and House Committees on the Budget, Part II*, Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, USA, February 1990, pp 215–216.

Two possibilities exist to moderate this gloomy prognosis. First, broad public support can be mobilized. Hunger as an issue is potent for reshaping food aid uses when its salience receives due attention. Media and anti-hunger lobby groups can and have helped to do this in the past. This would work to mobilize support only if past scepticism developed about negative effects of food aid, arising from some inappropriate uses in the past, were mitigated by progressive reform steps. Second, in an era of declining security, international economic policy has risen in importance. Continuing debt and trade deficits experienced by many developing countries and by the US reflect a failure to adjust to changing economic conditions and a misallocation of resources to unprofitable consumption.

In these circumstances, existing food aid policy is symptomatic generally of anachronistic economic policies, especially in the USA. The exigencies of realigning economic relations among states in the 1990s to meet the new challenge suggest that within the modest sphere of food aid, advances are achievable. Redirecting food aid to the needy would be a symbolic step towards emphasizing responsibility for global economic well-being as an obligation of all countries. By recognizing links among food aid, foreign debt and sustainable economic growth, reform in the food-aid policies of donors, especially the US, can end anachronistic aspects of foreign aid and provide a step towards both hunger alleviation and vitally needed collaboration on international economic policy.¹⁵

¹⁵See Robert Putnam and Nicholas Bayne, *Hanging Together: Cooperation and Conflict in the Seven-Power Summits*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, USA, 1987; and Robert O. Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, USA, 1984.